Ryan Hermansen
Religious Philosophy 2350
An Analysis of Evil and Hiddenness of God
Suffering. Pain. Heartbreak. Conflict. Genocide. These terms are all too familiar in human history and represent only a small measure of the formula for “evil”. Evil is complex; it can take many forms including horrific treatment between human beings, mistreatment toward animals and ecosystems, or manifest through catastrophic natural disasters. It is disappointingly pervasive and all too familiar for most of us. Evil is often considered the “rock of atheism” making for potent arguments against God’s existence, even for the undaunted theist (4, pg 146). To be fair, life is not all doom and gloom; as the timeless adage goes, “misery loves company". Life can be accompanied by beauty, love, joy, and is a place where technological advancements have alleviated many types of once thought incurable suffering. Why then must suffering be a part of our experience? If God is good, how can evil and pain exist in a world created by the ultimate source of goodness. The questionable existence of God adds an element of complexity to evil. If God in his infinite wisdom and perfection created a world with perfect knowledge, how is our third rock from the sun the best result? Finding meaning amid pain can prove to be difficult. Atheists and theists alike believe this is where God enters or remains absent in the discussion. I will outline types of evil, logical and evidential arguments whether God and evil are compatible, and God’s apparent hiddenness in the presence of suffering. Cruelty and horrendous evil are real; however, I will demonstrate how God’s creation of the world we know is suggestive of a noble yet complex opportunity which involves and would be incomplete without the risk of affliction.
As suggested, the existence of God is at the center of the topic of evil. Before we debate cases for and against, we need to better define evil as its general definition can be quite ubiquitous. Evil is often broadly understood, as there is no strict definition and there is a shared consensus on what qualifies as evil (4, pg 146). There are two broad concepts in which evil can be characterized, moral and natural evil, will guide our framework. Moral evil is defined as faulty human character or wrongful and hurtful behavior. These behaviors can be intentional or unintentional, physical or emotional, lying, stealing, greed, dishonesty, murder and the lot (4, pg 146). Natural evil is a result of impersonal factors or human actions. Natural disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis, mental health disorders, physical or cognitive disabilities, and cancer all fit the description. These do not entirely stem from human behavior but can produce widespread devastation. At a minimum, acts which are destructive or negative can be characterized as a compatriot of evil (4, pg 146).
We can now consider arguments against God’s existence in the face of evil. I will introduce how God is viewed as logically impossible or at best, highly unlikely. These arguments are known as the classic or logical and evidential problems of evil. The logical problem proposes there are two inconsistencies; God cannot exist if evil exists. For example, theists tout a perfect, omnipotent, omniscient being who created our world. But atheists challenge, is this perfect being then capable of creating a world with moral evil? If this God has the power, wisdom and desire to rid evil, then evil should not exist (4, pg 147). These claims introduce an inherent contradiction in the mind of the atheist and demonstrate the logical impossibility for God and evil to exist. This has been most famously challenged by philosopher, Alvin Platinga, who boldly refutes the contradiction. He tackles this issue by introducing a third premise which is under no requirement to be proven or true, but only possible, to merely refute the contradiction. Let me explain: Platinga introduces a “possible worlds” scenario with free-will beings. He asks you to consider a world where you are free but cannot choose evil. He goes on to point out how it would be logically impossible for an omnipotent God to force free-will beings to always choose moral good. Therefore, God could not have created a world with moral good without moral evil, thereby permitting a world where evil can take place. Here we have a logical scenario for God and evil to exist, debunking the logical inconsistency or impossibility; also known as the Free-Will Defense (5, 4, pg 148). Natural evils can be thought of in a similar manner, they are actions of free yet nonhuman persons or forces (4, pg 150).
The evidential problem of evil will be our next appraisal. The evidential argument asks theists to consider their beliefs in the face of real events of evil. Such as, why should a mother die during birth? There is no illogical claim, the argument is targeted at amplifying the unlikelihood of God’s existence, particularly in instances of senseless suffering without an obvious greater purpose (1, 4, pg 151). Atheists as well as theists admit to seemingly obvious examples of pointless suffering in the world. This alone is the crux of many atheists' challenges to God’s existence. Can unjustifiable suffering be permitted if there is a God? William Rowe attempts to show the unlikelihood of God with a factual and theological premise. The factual premise suggests God could prevent intense suffering without compromising the greater good or permitting an equal or worse evil to take place. The theological premise suggests God would prevent intense suffering unless it could not without losing a greater good or permitting an equal or worse evil (4, pg 152). Rowe’s point in the factual premise, is God could prevent meaningless suffering, but does not. If he would, he would compromise free-will, as stated in the theological premise (2). Pointless suffering maintains very few explanations, but we must consider free-will as one explanation. A theodicy, or justification of God’s actions, is utilized by theists to explain what greater purposes might be connected to certain suffering. If choices granted within free-will possess the potential for the significant good, then significant evil, even meaningless suffering, might prove to be the connection (4, pg 154). If the lower limit of evil was suppressed, this would inherently limit the upper limit of goodness; a risk God must have considered in this earthly experiment. This is not to suggest meaningless suffering is required but must be possible to preserve the function of free-will. The evidential problem has grounds only when and if God would not permit suffering without purpose, unless that purpose is the maintenance of free-will.
Next, let us consider the hiddenness of God. The overarching theme of this term can be embodied in one powerful question, where is God? If God, as the most powerful being exists, not desire to be more present or available to mankind? This is a fair question which must be thoroughly considered. The hiddenness of God is one both atheists and theists alike grapple with. Let’s first take an atheist's view. One might spend their entire life in devotion to God but regardless of commitment, rarely is a believer rewarded with proof of God’s existence. With such devotion, one might suggest God would be wise to honor worship with validation but chooses not to. Per the atheist, this desire for intense worship must be a “trick” or suggest, God does not exist (3). Michael Rea, a philosopher most known for his work at Notre Dame, provides three reasons God might remain hidden. Perhaps it is due to inadequate love, how a negligent father might behave. Clearly unavailable or disinterested. He is the God of the universe after all and could be focused on bigger, more important matters. Second, consider a being who is incapable or inept at showing love. One who does not appreciate or comprehend how a public presence might benefit God and humanity. Lastly, it is possible God is too weak to reveal himself or does not know the best way to go about doing so. Take any one reason and consider; if God exists, is he complicit in permitting evil by remaining hidden? (6, 7)
Theists view the hiddenness of God quite differently. Interestingly, Rea provides a theodicy, or defense, to his own examination regarding God’s hiddenness. The first defensible point is wickedness among humanity prevents God from revealing himself. If this were a more moral society then perhaps God would be more accessible. If he cannot tolerate wickedness, he has no choice but to remain hidden. Next, if God were to reveal himself, how would this impact free-will? Consider how your decisions might be influenced if you knew for certain there was a supreme being. Could you make choices freely of your own volition or would a conflict arise? Remaining hidden could be the best chance for love on both accounts; individuals choose to love God freely without persuasion and God shows love through less-hidden acts of reciprocation. Staying hidden is now out of ultimate necessity as free-will remains preserved. Next, perhaps God is the ultimate pursuit. The rewards which come from pursuing a faith driven life may be for our own benefit and maturation. The character development during this process makes us closer to God than any other pursuit possibly could. Rea’s last reason for why God may choose to remain hidden is an introverted nature. There are many behavioral qualities such as being loud, quiet, extroverted and introverted. You fit into one of these broad categories. Maybe God is subtle, unconventional, quiet, and shy. If God is communicating, it could be a whisper, or his methods might be unconventional and unrealized by humanity. If you live in devotion to God, you might be perceptive to these whisperings (3, 6).
While Rea, Rowe, and Platinga provide thoughtful deliberations, they all agree evil exists. What we then must ask ourselves, is the justification for evil sufficiently explained by the necessity of free-will? We have seen a common thread throughout the logical, evidential, and hiddenness problems as they relate with God’s existence and reality of evil. The commonality is - free will is supreme. Evil and God can be sufficiently explained by this principle. While the evidence for evil is overwhelming, so is the evidence for goodness. This could not be the case in a world where only good or only evil took place. A world where “innocent automata” exist might be free of pain, but it would also be void of joy, pleasure, sympathy, and love (5). I can empathize with those who may struggle to accept free-will as justifiable grounds for pain and suffering but I would ask them, what is the alternative? To experience happiness, one must know what it is to be sad. To know peace is to have experienced war. To give the gift of trust, one must be tried and found to be trustworthy, because we understand disappointment.
Platinga explained how “God created free beings, like himself, who are at the center of creative activity” (4, pg 149). Creativity is an infinitely edged sword. The ability to create and destroy demonstrates the “grandeur and peril” of being human. Evil, and all of its complexities, demands understanding. We see how our wide range of daily choices provides an invaluable opportunity for a sublime existence rather than merely existing. Our free-will can only be considered noble or good when choice exists, even if that choice is pain. For there is no sympathy without experiencing pain. By this account, evil cannot be attributable to God but rather to you and I. As sole possessors of our free-will it is my hope we will be responsible stewards with the power in our individual and collective possession. While I cannot confidently prove or suggest there is a greater good attached to all suffering, I can confidently suggest we are the greatest forces who can greatly limit the amount of suffering. Let us make conscientious efforts to limit pain, suffering, heartbreak and all other terrible acts and instead be the creators of the most possible good. Yes, evil exists; but so can a God who sacrifices control so you and I can create the best possible world.
References
- Trakakis, N. (n.d.). The Evidential Problem of Evil. Internet encyclopedia of philosophy. Retrieved May 4, 2023, from https://iep.utm.edu/evil-evi/
- Class Notes, Handout 7
- Class Notes, Handout 8
- Hasker, William, and Michael L. Peterson. Reason and Religious Belief: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion. Access and Diversity, Crane Library, University of British Columbia, 2009.
- Peterson, Michael L. Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings. 4th ed., Oxford University Press, 2010.
- Rea, M. (n.d.). Divine Hiddeness, Divine Silence . Retrieved May 3, 2023, from http://www.ifac.univ-nantes.fr/IMG/pdf/Rea_2011_Divine_Hiddenness_Divine_Silence.pdf.
Reflection
I chose to write about the concept of evil, God’s ability to exist in light of evil, and arguments against God’s existence. This intrigued me because I grew up believing in God. While I still believe there is a strong case for the existence of God, this class and paper provided the framework and breeding grounds to continue this lifelong discovery. Evil is everywhere, often subtle. I have been engaged with friends in this discussion in the past and often observed rather than participated in those difficult conversations. This is not because I had nothing to offer but because these discussions are challenging to say the least. Where does one begin or attempt to find the silver lining to one’s suffering?
This is the main reason I chose to write on this subject. It was challenging. It pushed me. It made me consider evil in a new light and introduced me to philosophical discussions which are very much open-ended and still debated. I was able to use our course textbooks and readings provided during our semester to assist in answering these difficult questions. I have not chatted with friends or family members on this topic yet because I feel as though I am coming across a gold mine of information which is still being processed. I’d like to share my valuable insights with all of them at some point.
One of the challenges I discovered while writing this paper was confronting old notions I’ve had for many years. For example, the hiddenness of God. When you grow up believing in God, you become numb to the fact he’s not very present. Or if he is present, it is quite subtle. I find the argument of, where is God, to be quite fair. In the end, it deepened my conviction of free-will and a God who believes in our ability to create something beautiful more than something destructive. A supreme being who can let go of control, in theory, is quite impressive. I try to consider all the small matters I want to control and feel out of sorts when they are beyond my reach. From this standpoint, it is inspiring.